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A MAN’S HOME IS HIS CASTLE: HOW THE LAW SHELTERS 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
BEVERLY BALOS* 
Violence against women is a pervasive problem in the United States.1  
Historically, however, society did not take violence against women seriously.2  
The law trivialized the abusive behaviors that led to harm against women.3  For 
example, until relatively recently there was not a legally recognized term for 
what is now labeled sexual harassment.4  It is now acknowledged that at work 
women are faced with the problem of sexual harassment. 
While at work women are faced with the problem of sexual harassment; at 
home women are faced with the problem of domestic violence.  There is ample 
research to demonstrate that domestic violence continues to be a persistent 
problem.5  The overwhelming targets of domestic violence are women abused 
by their intimate male partner.6  The conception of the risks of violence faced 
by women has been divided and categorized into separate areas leading to 
separate kinds of violence: domestic violence at home and sexual harassment 
at work.7  Both sexual harassment at work and domestic violence at home have 
been the subject of much scholarly discussion.  Both issues have also led 
 
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. 
 1. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: 
REPORTING TO POLICE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992-2000, at 1 (2002), at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf (finding that “[p]ersons age 12 or older 
experienced an average annual 140,990 completed rapes, 109,230 attempted rapes, and 152,680 
completed and attempted sexual assaults between 1992 and 2000” and that “[f]emale victims 
accounted for 94% of all completed rapes, 91% of all attempted rapes, and 89% of all completed 
and attempted sexual assaults”). 
 2. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of 
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993). 
 3. Id. at 518. 
 4. See LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON 
THE JOB xi (1978). 
 5. See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE 1993-2001 (2003) at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. 
 6. Id. at 1 (finding that while intimate partner violence made up 20% of non-fatal violence 
against women, it accounted for 3% of the non-fatal violence against men). 
 7. Bowman, supra note 2, at 519-20 (arguing that women are also targets of violence out in 
the public sphere in the form of street harassment and that there are a variety of current legal 
concepts that could be used to penalize this conduct). 
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advocates to organize legal reforms to make the civil and criminal justice 
systems more responsive to the needs of victims.8 
The division of violence into these separate categories, however, has left 
some forms of violence largely hidden.  Sexual harassment, not in the 
workplace, but in the home has been for the most part ignored.  Although 
perhaps not yet acknowledged as a pervasive problem, the incidence of 
reported sexual harassment in housing is evidence of a serious problem.9  
There also is evidence that sexual harassment in housing may be greatly 
underreported.10  Just as domestic violence and sexual harassment in the 
workplace were invisible until named, sexual harassment in housing is only 
now being uncovered and becoming more evident as an important societal 
issue. 
This article examines the parallels between sexual harassment in housing 
and domestic violence in the home.  Both domestic violence in the home and 
sexual harassment in the home are part of the continuum of violence against 
women.11  This continuum of violence operates in two ways.  First, although 
violence against women is divided into separate categories of violence, such as 
rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment, once these different forms of 
violence are seen on the continuum, it becomes clear that the different forms of 
violence are interrelated and that one form of violence supports other forms of 
 
 8. Once legally recognized, sexual harassment in the workplace became a form of sex 
discrimination forbidden by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Various civil and criminal 
legal reforms have been initiated in states to address issues of domestic violence including the 
development of civil orders of protection and mandatory arrest policies.  See BEVERLY BALOS & 
MARY LOUISE FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION 223-235 (1994).  On the federal level, the Violence Against Women 
Act has added penalties for interstate domestic violence and stalking.  See Violence Against 
Women Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261, 2261(A), 2262 (2000). 
 9. The only statistical study that gathered information specifically on sexual harassment in 
housing claims was a survey conducted in 1987 and sent to housing centers throughout the United 
States.  The centers that responded reported 288 incidents of sexual harassment in housing.  The 
author of the study suggested that because of various reasons, women are reluctant to report their 
harassment so that “it is likely that actual incidents of sexual harassment in housing number more 
than the 288 reported.”  See Regina Cahan, Comment, Home is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual 
Harassment in Housing, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1987).  Cahan further suggested that if 
we analogize to research conducted with respect to sexual harassment in the workplace and 
academia, formal reporting is rare, with rates somewhere between two and four percent 
depending on the research study. Therefore, by analogy, the incidence of formal complaints of 
sexual harassment in housing may represent only “two to four percent of the actual occurrences 
 . . . [and] 6,818 to 15,000 cases of sexual harassment in housing may have occurred.”  Id. at 
1069. 
 10. See Cahan, supra note 9. 
 11. See BALOS & FELLOWS, supra note 8 (explaining that violence operates on a continuum 
to inflict harm and constrain women’s lives). 
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violence.12  In addition, the continuum operates by disaggregating and dividing 
violence into separate, different categories to minimize the severity and 
pervasiveness of the violence.13 
In Part I, this article will provide a historical analysis of the development 
of the claim of sexual harassment in housing.  It traces the passage of the 
federal Fair Housing Act that prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis 
of sex and early cases recognizing sexual harassment in the workplace.  Part I 
also examines how the two concepts of sexual harassment in employment and 
sex discrimination in housing intersected to lead to the acknowledgment of a 
claim for sexual harassment in housing. 
Part II analyzes the appellate court cases that have interpreted claims for 
sexual harassment in housing pursuant to the Fair Housing Act and examines 
the judicially imposed requirements for bringing a successful claim.  In 
determining the merits of these claims, courts have relied on jurisprudence 
developed in the sexual harassment in employment area.  The resulting court 
imposed standard of “severe or pervasive” has limited the courts in finding that 
sexual harassment has occurred.  Part II also demonstrates the parallels 
between current judicial treatment of sexual harassment in housing and the 
historical treatment of domestic violence.  In sexual harassment in housing, the 
business exchange taking place in the market between landlord and tenant 
makes sex part of the rental transaction.  The landlord’s private exchange of 
sex in place of cash for rent takes on the appearance of a private business 
transaction not to be intruded upon.  Similarly, in domestic violence cases, the 
privacy of the marital relationship and the right of the husband to control his 
wife in the private sphere of the home, even if by force, was not to be intruded 
upon. 
Part III continues the exploration of the role of privacy begun in Part II, 
specifically focusing on the issue of privacy and domestic violence.  Privacy 
has been used to shield the abuse of women in intimate relationships, what we 
now recognize as domestic violence.  Two cases are examined that show the 
historical treatment by the courts of domestic violence.  The reasoning in these 
decisions reveals that the reluctance to intervene in domestic situations 
confirms that some amount of violence in the private sphere of the home has 
been found to be acceptable by the courts.  It also shows the courts’ 
willingness to minimize the violence and to protect the “privacy” of the 
husband and the marital home over the safety of the wife. 
The right to privacy in the home is further explored in Part IV.  Privacy, 
although historically central to preserving the sanctity of the home, has been 
applied only selectively.  While it has been used to protect the interest of the 
male in the home who is abusing his intimate partner, it has not been applied to 
 
 12. Id. at 183. 
 13. Id. 
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protect female tenants who are the targets of sexual harassment in housing by 
their landlords.  In both these instances, the societal value placed on privacy 
has been used to protect the more powerful dominant party at the expense of 
the subordinate party.  Protection of a zone of privacy expands and contracts 
depending upon the economic, social, and political power of the person 
claiming protection. 
Part IV asks who are the targets of sexual harassment in housing?  The 
most vulnerable women are targeted by landlords for abuse.  Poor women of 
color and women already homeless or facing the prospect of being homeless 
who are desperate for housing for themselves and their children frequently are 
the objects of sexual harassment.  Battered women attempting to leave abusive 
relationships can be faced with the prospect of homelessness.  Fleeing 
domestic violence with few resources contributes to increased vulnerability.  
Studies demonstrate that a substantial portion of women and children in 
homeless shelters have fled domestic violence.14  The failure of society to 
adequately protect battered women and their children within their own homes 
and the lack of adequate services for them means that there is a continuing 
supply of women and children in urgent need of housing and therefore exposed 
to the abusive behavior of unprincipled landlords. 
Part IV also describes the individual and systemic obstacles to successfully 
litigating a sexual harassment in housing case by describing a case undertaken 
by the University of Minnesota Law Civil Practice Clinic.  While recognizing 
that the courts have limited the usefulness of these suits by requiring severe or 
pervasive harassment before there is a recoverable harm, Part IV argues that 
even if courts were more sympathetic to this kind of litigation, it is still 
inadequate because such an individualized remedy does not address the 
scarcity of affordable housing and does not challenge the systemic class, 
gender, and race inequalities that sustain sexual harassment in housing. 
I.  THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE HOME 
In 1968 Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (“Act”).15  This Act was 
passed with the promise of moving our segregated society toward the goal of 
integration and ending discrimination in housing.  The Act, which is part of the 
civil rights statutes passed in the 1960s, embodied Congress’s ambitious 
purpose to remove housing barriers for people of color.16  The floor debate and 
 
 14. See Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421 (1991). 
 15. The Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, title VIII, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601- 3619 (2000)) [hereinafter the Act]. 
 16. See Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New 
Look at the Fair Housing Acts’s Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 212 
(2001). 
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statements of the Act’s sponsors indicate that the intent in passing the Fair 
Housing Act was to “remedy segregated housing patterns and their attendant 
problems — segregated schools, lost suburban job opportunities for minorities, 
and the alienation of whites and African-Americans.”17 
When passed in 1968, the Act prohibited discrimination in housing on the 
basis of race, color, religion, and national origin.18  Sex as a category of 
prohibited discrimination was added in 1974.19  The Act prohibits refusing to 
sell, rent, or negotiate for the sale or rental of or to otherwise make unavailable 
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of sex or other prohibited category.20  
It also prohibits discrimination “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of [the] 
sale or rental of a dwelling.”21  A third provision prohibits discriminatory 
notices, statements, and advertising, and the final relevant provision prohibits 
coercion, intimidation, threats, and interference with the rights guaranteed by 
the Act.22  The first United States Supreme Court decision interpreting the Act 
occurred in 1972.23  In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 
white residents sued to prohibit their landlord’s discriminatory actions against 
African Americans.24  The United States Supreme Court concluded that that 
the Act should be broadly construed and that Title VII decisions prohibiting 
discrimination in the workplace can be used as an exemplar in interpreting the 
Act.25 
In 1986 the United States Supreme Court for the first time recognized 
sexual harassment in the workplace as a form of sex discrimination pursuant to 
Title VII.26  In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson sued her employer pursuant to the 
protections against discrimination in Title VII because her supervisor imposed 
sexual contact on numerous occasions.27  Ms. Vinson was hired as a teller 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 - 3606, 3617 (2000) (originally codified in 
1969). 
 19. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat. 
633, 729 (1974).  There is very little legislative history explicating the addition of sex as a 
prohibited form of discrimination.  Senator Brock, in commenting in the Senate on the provision 
stated that “in too many cases women are discriminated against in housing transactions.”  120 
CONG. REC. 6146 (1974).  The categories of handicap and familial status were added in 1988.  
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000). 
 21. Id. § 3604(b) 
 22. Id. §§ 3604(a)−(c), 3617. 
 23. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 24. Id. at 206-07. 
 25. Id. at 209−12.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal to refuse to hire 
or to discharge an individual with respect to employment due to race or other categories.  As with 
the Fair Housing Act, Title VII was initially proposed without inclusion of a protected category 
for sex.  110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964). 
 26. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 27. Id. (all facts in this section are taken from pages 59-60 of the Court’s opinion). 
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trainee and over the course of her employment was promoted to assistant 
branch manager.  After her probationary period ended, her supervisor 
suggested they have sexual relations.  Initially, Ms. Vinson refused, but out of 
fear of losing her job she eventually agreed.  Her supervisor repeatedly 
demanded sexual favors, fondled her in front of other employees, followed her 
into the restroom, exposed himself to her, and forcibly raped her on several 
occasions. 
The Meritor Court held that for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must 
be sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to alter conditions of employment and 
create an abusive working environment.28  It also found that given the 
allegations, the supervisor’s conduct amounted to not only pervasive 
harassment, but also criminal conduct of the most serious nature, and the 
allegations were clearly sufficient to state a claim.29 
The conception of the right to be free of discrimination in housing and the 
right to be free of discrimination in the form of sexual harassment in the 
workplace intersected at the recognition of the right to be free from sexual 
harassment in housing.  The first reported decision occurred in 1983.30  In 
Shellhammer, the tenants sued their landlord for evicting them after Mrs. 
Shellhammer refused to pose for nude pictures or to have sex with the 
landlord.31  In the lower court, the magistrate ruled that such claims did state a 
cause of action under the Act.32  Relying on the judicial interpretation of Title 
VII for claims for sexual harassment in employment, the magistrate found that 
both quid pro quo and hostile environment claims were actionable under the 
Act.33  The Shellhammer case set a precedent by relying on the parameters set 
out in Title VII employment cases in order to determine if sexual harassment 
occurred in housing.34  Thus, if the claim were one involving the creation of a 
hostile environment, the complainant would need to establish that the 
landlord’s actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to change the terms 
and conditions of tenancy.  If the claim asserted quid pro quo behavior, the 
complainant must demonstrate the causal connection between the refusal to 
engage in the behavior demanded by the landlord and the subsequent loss of 
housing or negative action by the landlord.  It was not until ten years after the 
 
 28. Id. at 67. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Shellhammer v. Lewallen, No. 84-3573, 1985 WL 13505, *1 (6th Cir. July 31, 1985) 
(per curiam) (the magistrate entered his decision on Nov. 22, 1983). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Since Shellhammer, additional district courts have recognized that sexual harassment is a 
form of sex discrimination actionable under the Act.  See, e.g., New York ex rel. Abrams v. 
Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). 
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lower court decision in Shellhammer that the imposition of these standards to 
find sexual harassment in housing was adopted by the federal courts in Honce 
v. Vigil.35 
II.  APPELLATE COURT CASES 
The Honce case involved both quid pro quo and hostile environment 
claims.36  The plaintiff, a single mother in dire financial straits, claimed that 
the landlord threatened to evict her after he asked her out socially on three 
occasions, and she refused.  She ultimately decided to move.  The court 
determined that she failed to show the requisite connection between her refusal 
to go out with the landlord and his interference with her tenancy.  In analyzing 
the tenant’s hostile housing environment claim, the court used as its standard 
the assumption that “[h]ostile environment claims usually involve a long-
lasting pattern of highly offensive behavior.”37  Adopting the standard from 
Title VII cases, the court also found that the landlord’s behavior in this case 
was not severe or pervasive.  Because the landlord’s behavior did not include 
sexual conduct or language and because “other tenants of both sexes endured 
similar treatment . . . [the conduct was] not actionable under the hostile 
environment theory.”38  Interestingly, the dissent, viewed the landlord’s 
behavior in a less benevolent light.  The dissenting opinion stated that the 
“evidence also supports an inference that . . . [the landlord] was selectively 
hostile to women.”39  The dissent also observed in a footnote that the tenant 
had described further incidences of violence and harassment when she spoke to 
a police officer.40  Further, the dissent found that the “evidence indicates 
numerous women . . . felt compelled to move out as a result of . . . [the 
landlord’s] behavior . . . .” 41  According to the dissent, the majority opinion 
 
 35. Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).  In 1993, the Ninth Circuit also ruled on a 
sex discrimination claim pursuant to the Act.  The tenant was subjected to sexual assault by the 
building owner/manager.  This decision, however, was a procedural determination that the 1988 
amendments to the Act applied to cases pending at the time of the effective date of the 
Amendments.  United States v. Presidio Invs. Ltd., 4 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1993).  An earlier Third 
Circuit Fair Housing Act sex discrimination case did not involve sexual harassment but rather a 
claim by battered women who were prevented from establishing a shelter due to a restrictive 
zoning ordinance.  The women contended that the zoning ordinance violated the Act because it 
was discriminatory on the basis of gender.  The Court rejected this claim finding that the 
restrictive ordinance was facially neutral and applied to all transitional dwellings.  See Doe v. 
City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 36. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1085 (all facts in this section are taken from pages 1087-88 of the 
court’s opinion). 
 37. Id. at 1090. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1093. 
 40. Id. at 1095 n.2. 
 41. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1095 n.2. 
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applied an inappropriate standard by viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the landlord.42 
The Seventh Circuit, in 1996, also applied the Title VII employment sexual 
harassment standard to an unsuccessful sexual harassment in housing claim by 
a tenant.43  In DiCenso v. Cisneros, the landlord showed up at the eighteen 
year-old female tenant’s door to collect the rent.44  While caressing her arm 
and back, the landlord told her that if she could not pay the rent, “she could 
take care of it in other ways.”45  When she slammed the door in his face, the 
landlord called her various epithets, including “bitch” and “whore.”46  The 
court found that the landlord’s conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to establish a hostile environment.47  Although the landlord’s conduct was 
harassing, it was construed as only a single incident that was not harassing 
enough.  The majority decision stated that although the landlord “may have 
harassed her, he did so only once.”48  The majority decision did not address the 
landlord’s shouting of gendered epithets, apparently discounting that behavior 
as additional harassment.49  The court did concede that the landlord did make a 
statement that “vaguely invited [the female tenant] to exchange sex for rent.”50  
Despite this acknowledgement, the court did not find that the landlord’s 
behavior was sufficiently egregious because it only happened once, and “he 
did not touch an intimate body part and did not threaten [the tenant] with any 
physical harm.”51  The court went on to claim that the decision “should not be 
read as giving landlords one free chance to harass their tenants.”52  It is hard to 
see, however, how this decision does not establish exactly that standard.  
Despite the judicial protestations to the contrary, the Honce and DiCenso cases 
demonstrate that some amount of harassment is acceptable.53 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 44. Id. (all facts in this section are taken from pages 1005-06 of the court’s opinion). 
 45. Id. at 1006. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1009. 
 48. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008. 
 49. Id. at 1009. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1009 (the majority opinion claimed that its decision did not give 
landlords “one free chance to harass their tenants”).  A later Seventh Circuit decision also 
determined that the plaintiff tenant did not present sufficient evidence to sustain her sexual 
harassment claim against her landlord.  The tenant claimed the landlord had called her “hole,” 
berated her, and conducted surveillance of her sexual activity.  Cavalieri v. L. Butterman & 
Assocs., Nos. 98-1569, 98-1724, 1999 WL 38103, at *1 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 1999).  Citing DiCenso 
for the proposition that a single incident or isolated and innocuous incidents do not support a 
finding of sexual harassment, the court affirmed the district court decision granting summary 
judgment to the landlord.  Id. 
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Reiterating this same Title VII employment sexual harassment standard, 
the Ninth Circuit, in Hall v. Meadowood Ltd. Partnership, affirmed a grant of 
summary judgment to the landlord where the tenant’s claims included an 
allegation that his apartment manager’s gender-based comments and actions 
constituted sexual harassment pursuant to the Act.54  The court found that the 
conduct “occurred only occasionally and was not severe, physically 
threatening or humiliating.”55 
These cases illustrate the limitations and constraints of importing the 
judicial interpretation of “severe or pervasive” from sexual harassment in the 
employment setting to sexual harassment in the home.  By simply adopting the 
standard and its interpretation from the employment context, the courts do not 
seem to consider the different dynamics existing in the home setting.  These 
decisions also do not acknowledge the increased feeling of vulnerability of 
being targeted for harassment in your own home.  A number of commentators 
have remarked on the inappropriateness of the application of the “severe or 
pervasive” criteria to sexual harassment in the home and have suggested 
alternative standards.56 
 
 54. Hall v. Meadowood Ltd. Partnership, No. 99-17122, 2001 WL 311320 *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 
28, 2001). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 
ARIZ. L. REV. 17, 44-68 (1998) (suggesting that viewing harassment in housing in the context of 
the symbol of the home as a place of security and in light of the economics of the rental market 
and the intimate nature of the landlord tenant relationship will raise the perceived severity of 
incidents that might not meet the “severe and pervasive” standard in an employment context); 
Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under the Fair 
Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of 3604(C), 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771, 789-93 (2002) (proposing 
that sexual harassment cases in the housing context be brought, not under FHA’s § 3604(b) which 
uses the same language as Title VII and thus sets up a presumption of the same standard, but 
under § 3604(c) where the language is significantly broader than Title VII); Deborah Zalesne, The 
Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under 
Title VIII: Who is the Reasonable Person?, 38 B.C. L. REV. 861, 885-93 (1997) (rejecting the 
reasonable person standard related to objective severity and proposing that harassment-in-housing 
cases be examined in light of the behavior of the landlord and specific power differentials in the 
landlord-tenant relationship); Cahan, supra note 9, at 1062−65 (outlining a subjective standard 
focused on the victim’s perception, following Shellhammer, and based on FHA survey results 
where respondents described sexual harassment as including abusive remarks, unsolicited sexual 
behavior, solicitation of sexual behavior by promise or reward, coercion of sexual activity by 
threat or punishment, and punishment upon rejection of sexual overtures); Nicole A. Forkenbrock 
Lindemyer, Note, Sexual Harassment on the Second Shift: The Misfit Application of Title VII 
Standards to Title VIII Housing Cases, 18 LAW & INEQ. 351, 379-87 (2000) (noting the 
limitations of the standard currently applied and suggesting that courts should consider the unique 
context of the home and the perspective of the victim in evaluating what constitutes severe or 
pervasive harassment). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
86 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:77 
The one appellate case in which sexual harassment was found is the 1997 
case of Krueger v. Cuomo.57  In this case, the tenant, Debbie Maze, a single 
mother of two, had been seeking an apartment for a number of months.58  Her 
Section Eight housing assistance voucher was due to expire shortly.  When she 
found an apartment, the rent exceeded her voucher amount and her expected 
contribution.  The landlord, Krueger, told her that she could make up the 
shortfall by paying money on the side or she could “fool around or something.”  
Maze did not agree to this arrangement, but Krueger agreed to rent the 
apartment to her.  Prior to moving into the apartment, Maze experienced 
harassing conduct from Krueger, including rubbing, touching, and statements 
that they “were going to be real close.”59  After Maze moved into the 
apartment, Krueger continued to harass her.  Three or four times a week he 
would arrive at her apartment.  Once inside, Krueger would grab and touch 
Maze, even in front of her children.  He repeated his assertion that they would 
be “real close” and asked if they were “going to do good in bed.”60  Maze 
again would decline.  In response, Krueger would tell Maze “he was losing 
money because of her and reminded her that he could have rented the 
apartment to someone else.”61  Maze observed Krueger outside on a number of 
occasions watching her apartment.  She attempted to minimize any contact 
with Krueger and filed harassment charges against him.  Eventually the 
tenancy was so unbearable, Maze was forced to move. 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) 
ruling that because Maze was forced to move as a result of her rejection of the 
landlord’s sexual demands, Krueger had engaged in quid pro quo sexual 
harassment.62  The ALJ also found that Krueger had retaliated against Maze.63  
The appellate court affirmed the ALJ’s monetary award to Maze and the 
imposition of a civil penalty against Krueger.64 
The facts set out in Krueger illustrate a landlord’s predatory behavior 
directed at a tenant that he knew could not afford the apartment he agreed to 
rent to her.  His actions enhanced the vulnerability of a low-income, single 
mother who was anxiously seeking a home before her federal subsidy expired.  
His acknowledgment of her lack of sufficient income to meet the rental 
obligation and offer that she could either pay money on the side, which in 
effect would be fraud with respect to the requirements of the program 
subsidizing her rent, or in the alternative “fool around” to meet her rental 
 
 57. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 58. Id. (all facts in this section are taken from pages 489-91 of the court’s opinion). 
 59. Id. at 490. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Krueger, 115 F.3d at 491. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 493. 
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obligation means that he viewed her as available for sexual exploitation.  The 
sexual exploitation manifested itself as a market exchange for rent, in other 
words, he would take sex in the place of cash for rent.  By renting to her 
without an agreement to lower the rent to an amount the tenant could afford, 
the landlord is making the exchange of sex for rent part of his entitlement as 
landlord.  Similar assertions of landlord entitlement are described in DiCenso 
even though the plaintiff did not prevail on her sexual harassment in housing 
claim.  While the court did not find sexual harassment in housing in DiCenso, 
the landlord, while caressing her, told the tenant that if she could not pay the 
rent she could take care of it in other ways.65 
III.  PRIVACY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Historically, social, political, and legal institutions have supported male 
control of women through violence.66  One of the most powerful societal 
values that has reinforced the vulnerability of women to domestic violence has 
been the concept of the private, domestic sphere.67  Physical abuse of a wife by 
her husband was deemed a private matter and therefore not appropriate for 
state intervention.68  The privileging of privacy connected with the home 
resulted in a history of judicial decisions that refused to recognize the harm 
suffered by a victim of domestic violence and therefore a refusal to recognize a 
legal remedy.69 
In State v. Black, an 1864 North Carolina decision, the defendant, who was 
living apart from his wife, threw her down and pulled her hair.70  The court 
focused on the wife’s behavior, finding that she had verbally abused him and 
provoked his conduct.71  The court further found that because the husband was 
responsible for the behavior of his wife, he had the right to control her 
including the use of moderate chastisement.72  As long as he inflicted no 
permanent damage, the court would not go beyond the curtain of privacy of the 
 
 65. Dicenso, 96 F.3d at 1004. 
 66. See R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The ‘Appropriate’ Vicitms of 
Marital Violence, VICTIMOLOGY 1977-1978, at 426. 
 67. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 100-02 (1987) (suggesting that the sphere of privacy for women is a sphere of oppression).  
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the right of privacy surrounding the marital 
relationship and the home.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). 
 68. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE 31 (1990); Laurie Wermuth, Domestic Violence Reforms: Policing the 
Private?, 27 BERKELEY J. SOC. 27, 43 (1982). 
 69. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (Phil. Law 1868); State v. Black, 60 N.C. 262 
(Win. 1864). 
 70. Black, 60 N.C. at 263. 
 71. Id. at 264. 
 72. Id. at 263. 
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home.73  This decision, although quite different in language and tone and over 
one hundred years earlier than the appellate sexual harassment in housing 
cases, presents similar reasoning and a similar outcome.  Just as in DiCenso, 
the court minimized the violent acts and found some amount of violence 
acceptable.74  Ultimately the person responsible for that violence is not held 
accountable. 
In another nineteenth century domestic violence prosecution case, State v. 
Rhodes, the court again found that the violence was not severe enough to 
pierce the veil of privacy that surrounds the home of the husband.75  The 
defendant husband was indicted for assault and battery upon his wife.76  The 
jury found that he had “struck . . . [his wife], three licks, with a switch about 
the size of one of his fingers (but not as large as a man’s thumb) without any 
provocation except some words uttered by her . . . .”77  The judge concluded 
that the defendant had the right to whip his wife with a switch no larger than 
his thumb, and therefore, on these facts the defendant was not guilty.78  The 
appellate court, in reviewing the judge’s decision, found that while the husband 
did not have the right to whip his wife, the court will not interfere in the home 
in trifling cases.79  The court declared that it would “no more interfere where 
the husband whips the wife, than where the wife whips the husband.”80  The 
court also emphasized that “however great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, 
and even personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain, they are not 
comparable with the evils which would result from raising the curtain, and 
exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber.”81  
Unless the injury is permanent or malicious the law will not raise the curtain of 
privacy on the home.82  The judgment in favor of the defendant was upheld.83  
Once again, as in Black, Honce, and DiCenso, the court found some amount of 
abuse or violence was acceptable and failed to hold the person responsible for 
the abuse accountable for his actions.84 
Both nineteenth century decisions demonstrate that in dealing with cases of 
domestic violence, not only is some amount of violence permitted, but also that 
the privacy of the home will not be lightly invaded by the courts.  In these 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Compare Dicenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996), with Black, 60 N.C. at 262. 
 75. Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 453, 459. 
 76. Id. at 453. 
 77. Id. at 454. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 459. 
 80. Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 459. 
 81. Id. at 457. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 460. 
 84. See State v. Black, 60 N.C. 262 (Win. 1864); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 
1993); Dicenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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cases, it is the husband’s privacy and right of control being protected.  The 
failure by the courts to intervene leaves the target of the violence, the wife, 
without recourse and with little security in her privacy.  Thus, behind the rubric 
of privacy, male abusive behavior is protected, and the state’s failure to 
intervene supports his control.85 
Over the last thirty years, the battered women’s movement has endeavored 
to lift the curtain of privacy and reveal the violence hidden in the home.86  As a 
result of these efforts domestic violence is now more of a public issue.87  
However, even the progress that has been made in the development of civil and 
criminal law reform has not resulted in battering becoming a central issue on 
our political landscape.  The continuing vitality of the concept of abuse in the 
home as a private matter means that finding solutions becomes an 
individualized responsibility and not a societal obligation to remedy 
subordination. 
In domestic violence cases, the struggle has been to reveal the violence 
behind the curtain of privacy and encourage state intervention for the 
protection of the victim, at the expense of the privacy of the abuser.  In the 
sexual harassment in housing context, the struggle also is to reveal the violence 
behind the curtain of privacy but with a divergent result.  It is to encourage 
state intervention so that the right of privacy of the tenant is validated at the 
expense of control of the landlord. 
IV.  PRIVACY AND THE HOME 
The protection of home is central in our culture.  Rights viewed as property 
rights sometimes receive greater protection from government intervention than 
liberty rights.88  The home and non-interference with the sanctity of home is 
 
 85. When the state did intervene in marital violence, investigations focused on the homes of 
the poor and working-class immigrants.  See Jonathan L. Hafetz, A Man’s Home is His Castle?: 
Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 189 (2002) 
 86. For a history of the battered women’s movement see generally SUSAN SCHECTER, 
WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S 
MOVEMENT (1982). 
 87. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF 
PRIVATE VIOLENCE 42 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). 
 88. Compare Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003) (upholding California’s three-
strikes law in the sentencing of a defendant to twenty-five years to life for stealing three golf 
clubs finding that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle and was not 
grossly disproportionate); with BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) 
(finding that a punitive damage award of two million dollars against automobile manufacturer 
was grossly excessive).  See also MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 14 
(1993) (suggesting that that the “American Supreme Court goes out of its way to protect people 
against what it perceives as threatened government invasion when the issue is property rights, yet 
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well established.89  It is not just a physical place but is imbued with idealized 
characteristics.  It is a place of respite from the commercial marketplace.  It 
fosters intimate relationships and allows family life to flourish.  It is also a 
place of safety and physical comfort.  Beyond relational intimacy, the home 
also functions as a symbol for a feeling of belonging and a place where one can 
realize one’s potential.  “There is also the feeling that it would be an insult for 
the state to invade one’s home, because it is the scene of one’s history and 
future, one’s life and growth.  In other words, one embodies or constitutes 
oneself there.  The home is affirmatively part of oneself . . . .”90 
While there is a tradition of protecting the home from state intervention, 
the extent of the protection is determined by the characteristics of the person 
making the request for protection.91  Individualized private property and the 
protection of that property redound to the benefit of the powerful.  Poor 
women tenants do not tend to reap the benefit of the protection of private 
property when they are subject to sexual harassment in their homes by the 
landlord.  Rather, the landlord’s right to engage in the private rental 
transaction, even if it includes a demand of sex for shelter, and his right to 
control his private property are protected at the expense of the privacy and 
security of the tenant. 
A. Castles for Some 
The phrase, “A Man’s Home is His Castle” may have originated as long 
ago as the sixteenth century.92  Long established traditions of the common law 
have upheld the inviolability of the home.93  The judicial system has given 
effect to the special status of the home in numerous ways.  For example, in 
criminal law, the doctrine of self-defense includes a requirement that, if 
 
often goes out of its way to side with the government against the claimant when the issue is 
liberty”). 
 89. See United States v. Oliver, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
603 (1980) (warrantless arrest in one’s home impermissible because the sanctity of the home 
confers special protection); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (finding that an ordinance 
prohibiting residential picketing was constitutional because the significant government interest in 
seeing that people could enjoy in their homes a feeling of “well-being, tranquility, and privacy” is 
a goal of the “highest order”). 
 90. RADIN, supra note 88, at 57. 
 91. Hafetz, supra note 85, at 189. 
 92. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 642 n.259 (1999) (noting that the doctrine embodied by the statement that a man’s home is 
his castle traces back at least to the early sixteenth century). 
 93. Id. at 642.  See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
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possible, one safely retreat before taking action.94  Based on the notion that a 
man’s home is his castle, however, the requirement to retreat does not apply if 
one is in one’s own home.95  The home is also constitutionally protected from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.96  Moreover, the constitutional right to 
privacy articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court is nowhere more visible than 
when exercised in the home.97  In holding that warrantless arrests in public are 
constitutional, but warrantless arrests in the home are not, the Supreme Court 
explained: 
The . . . [Constitution] protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. 
In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the 
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home — a zone that finds 
its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to 
be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.”98 
Admittedly, greater protection has been afforded to privacy in the home in the 
context of criminal investigations rather than civil matters.99  However, the 
notion of the special status of the home as a repository of an enhanced right to 
privacy was articulated by the Supreme Court when it found that the state 
could not regulate the private possession of obscene material in the privacy of 
one’s own home.100 
The tradition of attributing a unique status to privacy in the home has 
continued.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that protecting privacy of 
the home is of the highest order.101  The Court has recognized the home as the 
“last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick”102 and as the “one retreat to 
which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily 
 
 94. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 60 (2003). 
 95. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(1); People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30, 35 
(Mich. 2002) (when a person is in his castle there is no duty to retreat); State v. Carothers, 594 
N.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1999) (duty to retreat does not attach to defense of dwelling); State v. 
Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339 (Ohio 1997) (no duty to retreat from one’s own home before resorting 
to self-defense). 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also RADIN, supra note 88, at 59-60. 
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 101. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980). 
 102. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). 
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pursuits . . . .” 103  The privileged position of the home in American 
jurisprudence is tied to both the sanctity of property rights as well as the 
exercise of individual liberty.104  As recently as 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to the protection of persons from “unwarranted 
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.”105 
One characteristic of privacy in the home that has attracted the attention of 
the Court is the protection of the unwilling listener.106  While commenting that 
there are many areas where an individual can expect simply to avoid speech 
they do not want to hear, the Court stressed that the home is different.107  
Rather, a special benefit of privacy within the home “which the State may 
legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions.”108  The pronouncements 
in numerous cases make clear that the home is viewed as a place of retreat for 
the flourishing of familial relationships, as a safe harbor from the marketplace, 
and as a place to develop individual personhood.  Because of these unique 
characteristics imbued in the home, it is granted exceptional protection by the 
courts. 
However, the application of the right to privacy in the home depends on 
who is asserting that right.  Admittedly, the appellate decisions addressing 
sexual harassment in the home are articulated as decisions applying the 
standards for sexual harassment claims, and the issue of privacy is not directly 
addressed.109  However, if we look behind the rhetoric of the severe or 
pervasive standard borrowed from employment discrimination jurisprudence, 
the result of these decisions is that the court protected the private property 
interest of the landlord at the expense of the tenant’s interest in the private 
sanctity of her home.110  The private interest of the more powerful was 
protected at the expense of the less powerful.  In addressing the issue of 
privacy in the context of state action and the U.S. Constitution, Frances Olsen 
points out that: 
Privacy is most enjoyed by those with power.  To the powerless, the private 
realm is frequently a sphere not of freedom but of uncertainty and 
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insecurity . . . . [T]he standard situation in which one enjoys privacy and 
freedom is not a situation of equality but one of hierarchy.  We virtually never 
all enjoy privacy equally, and the pretense that equality is the norm, and 
situations of domination an exception, is simply another way of maintaining 
the status quo.111 
The sphere of protected privacy is determined by one’s dominant or 
subordinate position.  Those in a position to exercise power have a greater 
zone of privacy protected than those who are in a subordinate position.112  A 
telling example, illustrative of this point is the United States Supreme Court 
decision, Wyman v. James.113  In Wyman, the plaintiff was the mother of a 
young son and a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(“AFDC”).114  Prior to her son’s birth, James applied for assistance, and as part 
of the eligibility process a caseworker made a visit to her apartment.  At that 
time there was no objection to the home visit.  James was found to be eligible, 
and assistance was authorized.  Two years later a caseworker wrote to inform 
James that another home visit was scheduled.  James objected to the visit and 
agreed to supply any information that was reasonable and relevant to her need 
for assistance but insisted that any discussion occur outside her home.  The 
caseworker then informed James that the home visit was required by law, and 
her refusal to agree to the visit would result in termination of her benefits.  
After an administrative hearing in which James continued to refuse to agree to 
a home visit but reiterated her willingness to cooperate and engage in visits 
elsewhere, her benefits were terminated. 
The Court initially acknowledged that when a case involves a home and 
some sort of intrusion into that home, the issue of the protection of personal 
security in the home is raised.115  It went on to find, however, that such 
protections did not apply here.116  Further, even if arguably the Fourth 
Amendment did apply, the home visit was not an unreasonable search.117  The 
Court listed a number of factors that led to its conclusion that James had no 
protectable right to privacy in her home.118  For the Court, the fact that James 
was being assisted by tax dollars meant that the State had the right to ensure 
that the intended beneficiaries of the tax-produced assistance were in fact the 
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ones receiving the benefit.119  The Court also contended that the home visit had 
a rehabilitative purpose, and the investigative aspects of the visit were 
overemphasized.120  The process used, which included advanced notice of the 
visit and a prohibition on forcible entry or visits outside of working hours, 
minimized any burden on the homeowner’s right against intrusion.121  In 
enumerating the factors in support of its position, the Court scrutinized James 
herself, casting her actions and character in an unfavorable light.122  The 
majority opinion characterized James as demanding “from the agency that 
provides her and her infant son with the necessities for life . . . the right to 
receive those necessities upon her own . . . terms . . . and to avoid questions of 
any kind.”123  It further portrays James as failing to 
ever really to satisfy the requirements for eligibility; . . . [making] constant and 
repeated demands; . . . [demonstrating] reluctance to cooperate; . . . 
evasiveness; and . . . occasional belligerency.  There are indications that all 
was not always well with the infant Maurice (skull fracture, a dent in the head, 
a possible rat bite).  The picture is a sad and unhappy one.124 
The implications of this disapproving picture of a welfare recipient were 
not lost on Justice Douglas.  In his dissent Justice Douglas asked “[i]f the 
welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent, affluent cotton or 
wheat farmer receiving benefit payments for not growing crops, would not the 
approach be different?”125  Justice Douglas went on to point out that 
“constitutional rights — here the privacy of the home — are obviously not 
dependent on the poverty or on the affluence of the beneficiary.  It is the 
precincts of the home that the Fourth Amendment protects; and there privacy is 
as important to the lowly as to the mighty.”126  Justice Douglas was articulating 
the normative value that the application of constitutional rights not be 
determined by one’s power and affluence.127  However, the fact that the 
articulation of that goal was found in the dissent belies its attainment.  Justice 
Marshall, in his dissent, questioned the basis for the majority opinion’s 
assertion that even if deemed a search, the home visit would be reasonable.128  
Justice Marshall responded by pointing out that child abuse is not limited to 
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indigent households.129  Justice Marshall went on to question the majority’s 
reasoning by asking: 
Would the majority sanction, in the absence of probable cause, compulsory 
visits to all American homes for the purpose of discovering child abuse?  Or is 
this Court prepared to hold as a matter of constitutional law that a mother, 
merely because she is poor, is substantially more likely to injure or exploit her 
children?130 
Decisions such as Wyman make clear that the legal protection of privacy is 
determined by the economic power of the party asserting the privacy right.  
Here, James, a recipient of public assistance, had her right to privacy in her 
own home disregarded by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Her dependence on public 
welfare for support for herself and her son resulted in her zone of privacy 
being contracted.  The failure of the Court to recognize her privacy rights 
resulted in reinforcing her subordinate position.131 
In the battering cases, the judicial recognition and validation of privacy in 
the home supported male violence against women and women’s unequal status.  
Privacy justified the lack of state intervention to protect the target of the abuse.  
In both instances, where the court permitted intervention in the home of a 
recipient of public assistance and where the courts refused to intervene when a 
husband assaulted his wife, those with the most power and in a dominant 
position benefited from protective judicial decisions at the expense of the 
security and autonomy of the less powerful.132 
Given the longstanding recognition of the special status of the home, as a 
place to be protected from unwanted intrusion, as a special sphere where the 
occupant has privacy from the rest of the world, and as a private domain 
controlled by the resident, the question arises as to why the appellate courts 
have been reluctant to recognize this principle in sexual harassment in housing 
cases.  Perhaps we can begin to answer that question by looking at who are the 
targets of sexual harassment in housing.  Who are the tenants who are trying to 
assert their rights to privacy and to be free of discriminatory intrusion by the 
landlord? 
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B. Who Are the Targets of Sexual Harassment in Housing? 
The U.S. Supreme Court decided that there is no fundamental right to 
housing or to any specific quality of housing.133  Thus, while the notion of “a 
man’s home is his castle” is fully entrenched in our law and culture, only those 
who can afford a home reap the benefit.  Although “a man’s home is his 
castle,” no one has the right to or is owed a “castle.” 
While no one is entitled to housing, it is also accurate to point out that the 
respective rights of landlords and tenants have evolved over the last thirty 
years.  Reforms have given tenants rights that under the common law property 
framework did not exist.  For example, reform efforts include the right of 
tenants to habitable residences, to defenses from evictions for nonpayment of 
rent by raising the landlords’ breaches, local housing codes that have 
established minimum standards of habitability, and protection from retaliatory 
eviction.134 
These changes, however, did not give rise to a recognized right to adequate 
housing.  The question remains as to how effective these reforms are with 
respect to the systemic difference in power between those who are seeking to 
obtain and keep a home and those who have control over the resource sought.  
The need for reforms to provide some protections for tenants perhaps points 
out the difficulty of low-income renters who do not have sufficient power to 
“effectively bargain for these rights in the market.”135  Even for those renters 
who are not low-income, the nature of the real estate market may make it 
difficult to bargain effectively.  For example, it is problematic to make 
comparisons between apartments because features of particular apartments and 
neighborhoods differ.  It is complicated and expensive for the tenant to attempt 
to move out once occupying an apartment even if a better bargain is found.136 
By definition, if one owns a home, one is not subject to sexual harassment 
by a landlord.  Home ownership, however, is an unattainable goal for many 
low-income persons.137  Faced with a market place in which they have little 
bargaining power, low-income tenants’ vulnerability is exacerbated by a 
market in which affordable housing is declining while the demand for it is 
increasing.138  The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”), the federal agency responsible for administering federal housing 
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programs, has recognized the increasing difficulty faced by low-income 
persons attempting to find affordable housing.139  HUD acknowledges that 
“crisis rent levels have swelled the number of households with worst case 
housing needs, which now stands at a record 5.3 million.  These 
households . . . pay more than half of their meager incomes for rent or live in 
substandard housing.”140 
Being a low-income tenant or experiencing poverty is a key factor in being 
vulnerable to sexual harassment in housing.  Moreover, women experience 
poverty at a disproportionate rate in our society.  For example, in 1998 the U.S. 
Census Bureau reported that 12.7% of the general population was living in 
poverty while 29.9% of female-headed households were living in poverty.141  
Women experience higher rates of poverty than do men and women who are 
heads of households with dependent children “have extremely high poverty 
rates.”142  Looking at the descriptions of the plaintiffs in the reported federal 
cases reveals that they are poor women, often providing the only support for 
their families and often facing homelessness.143 
It is clear that victims of sexual harassment in housing are low-income 
renters with few options and that those renters are women and significantly 
women of color.144  Racial discrimination limits housing opportunities.145  For 
renters of color, discrimination makes housing more difficult to obtain and 
more costly.146 
The entitlement expressed by landlords’ actions in the described cases is 
constitutive of the business exchange taking place in the market between 
landlord and tenant.  Targeting low-income women for sex in exchange for 
 
 139. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ABOUT HOUSING (Sept. 2002), at 
http://www.hud.gov./offices/hsg/hsgabout.cfm. 
 140. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 1999 THE STATE OF THE CITIES ix (1999); see 
also Cahan, supra note 9, at 1067 (finding 98% of harassment victims in the survey had annual 
incomes of less than $20,000 and 75% had incomes under $10,000). 
 141. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES  v, vi (1998). 
 142. Adams, supra note 56, at 37−38. 
 143. See Kreuger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing plaintiff as an African 
American woman who was also a recipient of Section eight housing assistance); Doe v. 
Maywood Hous. Auth., No. 93 C 2685, 1993 WL 243384 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1993) (describing 
plaintiff as recipient of Section eight housing assistance); Grieger v. Sheets, No. 87 C 6567, 1989 
WL 38707 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1989) (describing plaintiff as recipient of Section eight housing 
assistance); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting that plaintiffs were 
homeless women staying in shelter); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993) (describing 
plaintiff as a single mother in severe financial difficulty). 
 144. See Adams, supra note 56, at 35; Deborah Zalesne, supra note 56, at 886.  “In 
employment discrimination cases, the victim of sexual harassment is usually a woman and often a 
minority.  When sexual harassment occurs in the housing context, however, the typical victim is 
not only a minority woman but a poor minority woman.”  Id. 
 145. Adams, supra note 56, at 35−36. 
 146. Id. at 36. 
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shelter becomes part of the rental transaction.147  Just as prostitution is 
considered a private market exchange, albeit an illegal one, here the landlord’s 
private exchange of sex in place of cash for rent takes on the facade of a 
private business transaction not to be intruded upon.148  The reluctance to 
intervene in the private actions of citizens with respect to domestic violence 
and to minimize the violence finds a parallel here demonstrated by the 
reluctance of the courts to intervene in the private business matters of 
landlords, unless there is a sufficient cause, defined by the courts as severe or 
pervasive harassment and interpreted by them to require substantial abusive 
behavior.149  By minimizing the severity of the violence and labeling what are 
sexual assaults as “harassment,” the violent and illegal conduct of the landlord 
is obscured.  The solicitation by landlords of sex in exchange for rent is 
arguably soliciting illegal prostitution.  However, once the behavior is labeled 
sexual harassment, the criminal nature of the act is concealed.  By protecting 
the landlord’s private business dealings, the courts have diminished the privacy 
rights of the tenant and helped to disguise sexual violence. 
In the sexual harassment in housing appellate decisions, it is the landlord’s 
right to control his premises and to conduct his business free of interference 
being protected at the expense of the tenant’s right to privacy in her home.  
Although the sexual harassment in housing appellate decisions are recent 
cases, they bear a striking resemblance to mid-nineteenth century judicial 
decisions determining guilt or non-guilt in domestic violence cases.  While the 
domestic violence cases involve criminal prosecutions, the reasoning used by 
the courts in minimizing the violence and in protecting the perceived 
entitlement of the more powerful by the use of the screen of privacy is echoed 
in the appellate sexual harassment in housing decisions. 
 
 147. See, e.g., Kreuger, 115 F.3d at 489 (describing the landlord’s suggestion that while he 
knew the plaintiff could not afford the apartment she could pay money on the side or “fool around 
or something” to meet the rental payments); DiCenso v Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 
1996); Doe, 1993 WL 243384 at *1 (describing plaintiff as recipient of Section eight housing 
assistance and noting that the defendant an employee of the housing authority, stated that he 
would certify the plaintiff if she had sex with him); Grieger, 1989 WL 38707 at *1 (describing 
plaintiff as recipient of Section eight housing assistance and describing demand that plaintiff have 
sex with landlord once a month if she wanted to keep her house and landlord’s threats to make 
life difficult with the Section eight people if plaintiff did not agree). 
 148. See Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming 
Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1220, 1222 n.3 (1999) (recognizing prostitution as the market 
exchange of sex for money that encompasses not only money but also the exchange of money’s 
worth so as not to exclude situations in which sex is exchanged for shelter); Radin, supra note 88, 
at 14 (noting that property rights are more carefully protected from government invasion than 
liberty rights). 
 149. See infra pages 8-14. 
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C. Battered Women and Homelessness 
Women in abusive relationships have been faced with the question, “Why 
do you stay?” Perhaps one response to this question is, “Where am I to go?”  
Battered women who are attempting to leave abusive relationships are often 
faced with nowhere to go. 
Battered women encounter many obstacles when attempting to leave an 
abusive relationship.  Sometimes economically dependent on the abuser or 
unable to access joint assets, women of all economic classes face the prospect 
of homelessness when fleeing an abusive relationship.  Additionally, battered 
women are often isolated.  One aspect of the dynamics of domestic violence is 
the abuser’s exercise of control by restricting the contacts the victim/survivor 
has with friends or relatives.  Abusers also may threaten friends and family 
members so that there is no prospect of refuge with friends or family even on a 
temporary basis.  Opportunities for employment also may be negatively 
affected by abuse.  As part of the abuser’s efforts to control his partner and 
continue her dependence, abusers undermine their partners’ attempts at 
employment by harassing them at work, making them late, causing absences, 
and inflicting violence.  Maintaining economic power contributes to and is part 
of the abuser’s control over his partner.150 
While there are many contributing factors to the problem of homelessness, 
a recent survey of twenty-five cities found that domestic violence was 
identified by eleven cities as a primary cause of homelessness.151  Earlier 
studies indicate that a high percentage of homeless families identify domestic 
violence as the cause of their homelessness.152  Although not always identified 
as such, a significant portion of the population of homeless shelters are 
battered women and their children.153  A research study that examined the lives 
of sheltered homeless and low-income housed mothers found that 91.6% of the 
homeless mothers had experienced physical or sexual assaults and that 63% 
were committed by an intimate male partner.154  The research shows that 
victims of domestic violence suffer both the physical, economic, and emotional 
consequences attendant to battering as well as potential homelessness as they 
attempt to leave an abusive relationship.155 
 
 150. Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 237, 243 
(1994). 
 151. See U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN 
AMERICA’S CITIES 2002: A 25-CITY SURVEY 82 (2002), at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/ 
hungersurvey/2002/onlinereport/HungerAndHomelessReport2002.pdf. 
 152. See Zorza, supra note 14, at 420-21. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Ellen Bassuk et al., The Characteristics and Needs of Sheltered Homeless and Low-
Income Housed Mothers, 276 JAMA 640 (1996). 
 155. See Charlene K. Baker et al., Domestic Violence and Housing Problems, 9 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 754, 754−55 (2003). 
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In a recent study analyzing housing problems and homelessness of 110 
women who had experienced domestic violence, the researchers found that 
38% experienced homelessness immediately after separating from their 
abusers.156  Interestingly, the women acknowledged that if the justice system 
had been responsive to their needs and arrested their abusers or forced them to 
stay away; they would not have needed to leave their homes.157  Obtaining 
safe, secure housing is often a key element in planning for the safety of a 
battered woman and her children.  While reform efforts have resulted in the 
development of shelters for victims of domestic violence, shelters are 
frequently filled and cannot house all the women and children who request 
shelter.158  Moreover, shelters, even when available, do not provide permanent, 
affordable housing.  They are a response to a crisis situation and are generally 
available only on a short-term basis.  Faced with shelters at capacity, low-
income women experience great difficulty in finding affordable housing.  
Federal programs designed to provide rental assistance to low-income renters 
may have waiting lists as long as two years.159  Additionally, changes in 
federal housing policy have resulted in fewer low cost housing units.160 
Victims of domestic violence not only experience the complex social and 
economic difficulties of separating from an abuser, they also are faced with the 
grim reality of a housing marketplace that has an ever shrinking supply of 
affordable housing at the same time that there is an ever increasing number of 
women and children seeking shelter.161  The decreasing availability of 
affordable housing and the increasing need for low cost housing contribute to 
the difficult predicament experienced by poor homeless women seeking shelter 
for their families.  This predicament is exacerbated by the failure of society to 
adequately meet the needs of victims of domestic violence so that experiencing 
domestic violence becomes a marker for potential homelessness.162 
 
 156. Id. at 766. The study also found that “[a]pproximately half of the women left their 
homes . . . ; the other half stayed while their partners left . . . .”  Id. at 767. 
 157. Id. at 767. 
 158. See U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN 
AMERICA’S CITIES 1998 62 (1999), at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/homeless/hunger98.pdf 
(stating that an estimated 30% of requests for shelter by homeless families were denied in 1998 
due to lack of resources); Baker, supra note 155, at 755 (noting that many women cannot be 
housed at a battered women’s shelter when they leave their abusive partners because many 
shelters consistently operate at capacity). 
 159. Baker, supra note 155, at 755. 
 160. AMY CORREIA & JEN RUBIN, HOUSING AND BATTERED WOMEN (2003), at 
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/vawnet/arhousing/arhousing.html. 
 161. See NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, RESEARCH ON HOMELESSNESS; 
HANDOUT 2, at http://www.nwrel.org/cfc/frc/pdf/Handout2.pdf (last visited on Jan. 6, 2004). 
 162. In addition to the loss of affordable housing units affecting the ability of battered women 
to obtain safe housing for their families when leaving a violent relationship, the so-called “one-
strike” policy has created an additional barrier for victims of violence in their effort to maintain 
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D. The Clinic Experience 
There is no question that litigation in the area of sexual harassment in 
housing presents many obstacles.  The judicially imposed legal standard 
adopted from the employment context creates barriers to successfully obtaining 
legal remedies for victims.  The belief existent in the domestic violence arena 
that some amount of abuse is acceptable maintains its vitality in sexual 
harassment litigation.163  Clients face particularized vulnerabilities due to 
societal biases based on race, class, and gender.  Their own past experience of 
abuse creates additional challenges in conducting the litigation so that the 
possibility of recovery is maximized, yet the past abuse experienced by the 
client is not exploited by the defense. 
It is important to recognize, however, that even if the judicial interpretation 
of the standards needed to prove sexual harassment in housing were not so 
narrow; a private right of action to vindicate the privacy and security rights of 
tenants would be inadequate.  An individualized private solution in the form of 
a lawsuit leaves unchallenged the systemic inequalities of race, class, and 
gender that make a class of persons particularly vulnerable to being targeted 
for sexual harassment in housing.  Despite these shortcomings, one way to 
obtain relief and to support the right of tenants to have a private sphere of 
safety and security in their own homes, at least on an individual basis, i.e., to 
have a “castle,” is to persevere in bringing these cases. 
The statistics describing the targets of sexual harassment in housing 
conform to my own experience representing plaintiffs in Fair Housing Act 
claims against landlords.  In the Civil Practice Clinic at the University of 
Minnesota Law School, law students under my supervision have represented a 
number of plaintiffs who had been the targets of sexual abuse by their 
landlords.164  The plaintiffs in our cases were low-income women of color 
struggling to support themselves and their families and desperate to find 
affordable housing.  They also had suffered domestic or sexual abuse in their 
past, either as adults or as children. 
 
housing.  This policy, authorized by the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 
1990 and enhanced by the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, permits public 
housing authorities to deny housing or evict tenants based on criminal behavior.  Advocates have 
reported that victims of domestic violence are faced with the threat of eviction as this policy holds 
them accountable for the criminal acts of family members, including their abusers.  See Claire M. 
Renzetti, One Strike and You’re Out: Implications of a Federal Crime Control Policy for 
Battered Women, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 685, 685-98 (2001). 
 163. See infra text accompanying notes 30-89. 
 164. Cases on file in the Civil Practice Clinic, University of Minnesota Law School.  Not all 
of the cases were formally filed in court.  Some were filed as complaints with HUD and settled 
early in the administrative process.  The settled cases that were filed in court contained 
confidentiality clauses as part of the settlement. 
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In one of the Clinic cases that settled relatively early through the HUD 
administrative process, the Clinic represented a woman who was a single 
mother raising a teenage daughter.165  The client suffered sexual harassment by 
her landlord, an older man.  The client learned of an available apartment 
through relatives and made an appointment to see it.  When the client went to 
see the apartment, the landlord asked who would be living there.  The client 
said she and her teenage daughter would be the occupants.  In response, the 
landlord asked where the client’s husband was and wondered why the 
daughter’s father would ever leave a woman as beautiful as the client.  The 
client did not think much of these comments at the time; she assumed the 
landlord was just being friendly and making small talk.  When the client and 
her daughter moved in, the landlord again made comments similar to those he 
had made when the client first looked at the unit. 
Not long after moving in, the client lost her primary job.  While she 
continued to work part-time, her income was not sufficient to cover the rent.  
When the landlord called about the late rent and the payment of a late rent fee, 
he also told the client that he helps out a few of his tenants and that he would 
like to help the client. 
Also at this time, the landlord started sending letters expressing his desire 
for sex with the client.  He also started calling and appearing at the apartment 
without notice.  He told the client he would like to have a sexual relationship 
with her and have a child with her, and if she agreed, she would not have to 
pay rent.  Later, the landlord said that if his wife died, he would like to marry 
her. 
The client declined, but the landlord continued to send letters containing 
sexual demands, to make increasingly explicit phone calls, and to enter the 
apartment when the client was away.  This continuing, aggressive behavior 
caused the client to stay at home to guard the door, and she found herself 
staying up all night, fearing that the landlord would appear at the apartment or 
call.  The landlord also made pre-textual entries into the apartment, claiming a 
need to repair something or inspect a repair that had been completed. 
The landlord sexually assaulted the client on several occasions.  The 
assaults included restraining the client, kissing her, and sexually touching her.  
He continued to write numerous letters to her, repeatedly and explicitly stating 
he wanted a sexual relationship and could help her financially.  He also made 
comments about the physical appearance of the client’s daughter. 
The pattern of behavior described here is not unlike the federal cases 
previously cited.  The landlord who possessed and controlled a commodity in 
short supply used his dominant position to exploit the tenant in a subordinate 
 
 165. The summary factual description of the client’s experience that follows is part of the case 
file at the University of Minnesota Law Clinic.  I have omitted names to protect the privacy and 
confidentiality of the client. 
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position.  His predatory behavior targeted a vulnerable tenant with little or no 
resources.  The action of sexually using the tenant became part of the private 
business exchange of collecting rent.  His private market transaction and 
exercise of control over his property resulted in placing the tenant in the 
position of being subjected to sexual demands and the fear of losing her home. 
These cases may also give rise to various kinds of state law claims.  For 
example, facts such these may encompass a state law claim for coercion into 
prostitution.166  This is a state cause of action that recognizes the harms caused 
to persons who are coerced into prostitution.167  In Minnesota, the statute 
broadly defines coercion, and the court is directed to look at the totality of the 
circumstances.168  Evidence of coercion includes the exchange of sex for 
shelter.169  The act allows for the recovery of economic and emotional 
damages.170 
Pleading this cause of action requires extensive discussion with the client.  
Clients who come forward to risk the difficulties of a lawsuit alleging sexual 
harassment may decide that the stigma attached to including this cause of 
action is too severe.  Often, they have suffered physical and/or sexual abuse in 
the past and pursuing a lawsuit for sexual harassment in housing requires that 
they describe, yet again, how they have been targeted for sexually abusive 
behavior.  The ongoing proceedings of the litigation occur at the same time 
that they continue to struggle economically to provide for themselves and their 
families.  Even if the facts fall within the definition and required elements of 
the statute, to include a cause of action for coercion into prostitution means 
that the client risks being labeled a prostitute, with all of the indignity and 
shame attached to that label.  While the client is faced with the stigma of being 
labeled a prostitute, no one seems inclined to label the landlord a “john.” 
If clients have experienced past sexual and physical abuse, these issues 
may re-emerge and be exacerbated by the type of discovery that takes place in 
the context of this kind of litigation.  Depositions, interrogatories, and requests 
for medical records will be made by the landlord’s counsel and will focus not 
 
 166. See MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.70 − 87 (2002).  A number of courts have found that the 
refusal to engage in sexual intercourse with a supervisor at work amounts to refusing to engage in 
prostitution and therefore can be the basis for an abusive discharge claim as one means to 
vindicate the public policy against prostitution.  See Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 
A.2d 1080 (Md. 2000); Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 
1991); Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984) (declaring that a 
“woman invited to trade herself for a job is in effect being asked to become a prostitute”).  
Complaints can also include common law claims of assault, battery, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. 
 167. See MINN. STAT. § 611A.81 (2002).  A few other states have enacted similar statutes.  
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 663J-1−9 (1999); FLA. STAT. § 796.09 (2003). 
 168. MINN. STAT. § 611A.80(2) (2002). 
 169. MINN. STAT. § 611A.80(2)(23) (2002). 
 170. MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.81(2)(1) - (2) (2002). 
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only on the incidents that are the subject of the pending litigation, but also on 
the past abuse.  There is the potential for plaintiffs to face extremely harsh 
questioning about abuse issues that perhaps were never fully resolved. 
The reality of the life circumstances faced by clients raises additional 
challenges in proceeding to litigate sexual harassment in housing cases.  After 
eviction by the abusive landlord or being forced to move due to the sexually 
harassing conduct, clients sometimes face homelessness.  If not forced into a 
shelter due to a lack of other alternatives, clients often stay with relatives or 
friends until they are able to find affordable housing.  Needless to say, these 
are short-term strategies which result in the client frequently moving.  Frequent 
moving often makes continuing contact with the client difficult.  The 
importance of a lawsuit may pale in comparison to the survival issues clients 
face.  Further, because of the clients’ often precarious economic position, 
settlement sooner, rather than later, becomes attractive.  When advocating for 
clients in these lawsuits, one may believe that an offer to settle severely under 
values the client’s claim.  However, the prospect of years of litigation when the 
client is again confronted with the possibility of homelessness, may make the 
offer one that cannot be refused.  Careful consultation with the client is 
necessary to discuss the consequences of accepting an offer that may be of less 
monetary value but meets an immediate need. 
The difficulties that adhere to this litigation are both individual and 
systemic.  Each client comes to the proceedings with their own individual 
experiences and claims.  Yet, each client is faced with the obstacle of 
inadequate affordable housing and structural class, gender and race inequalities 
that create and support a category of women who are targeted for sexual 
harassment in their homes.  While clients face these systemic barriers, 
litigation, if successful, provides a valuable but limited remedy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There has been a continuing effort to obtain recognition for the right of 
victims of domestic violence to state protection.  It is not acceptable for the 
court to hide behind the veil of privacy and affirm the right of the husband to 
control his wife through violent means as long as the violence is not too severe.  
The practice of affirming his privacy rights at the expense of her safety is no 
longer deemed an appropriate response to domestic violence.  While there are 
still instances of minimizing domestic violence in the home and the effort to 
obtain services and resources to provide an adequate remedy for victims 
continues, the struggle to have courts intervene in the private sphere has 
produced numerous law reforms designed to make the criminal and civil 
justice systems more responsive to the needs of victims of domestic violence. 
Even as progress has been made in state intervention into the home in the 
area of domestic violence, the concept of privacy in the home continues to 
occupy a revered place in our society.  Yet, in the area of sexual harassment in 
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housing, courts have not effectuated the privacy rights of the tenant 
experiencing sexual harassment by the landlord.  By applying the 
jurisprudential requirements developed from sexual harassment in employment 
cases, the courts have limited the viability of the sexual harassment in housing 
cause of action.  While imposing judicial constraints that bind plaintiffs, the 
courts have continued to privilege the privacy of the more powerful landlord at 
the expense of the less powerful tenant.  Targeting the most vulnerable tenants, 
predatory landlords exploit the scarcity of affordable housing and make the 
exchange of sex for rent a part of their private business transaction.  The façade 
of the private business exchange makes courts reluctant to intervene, just as 
courts were reluctant to intervene in the private martial relationship in the 
home.  The lack of sufficient affordable housing coupled with class, gender, 
and racial inequalities means that even if courts were more amenable to finding 
sexual harassment in housing by abandoning the judicial requirement of 
“severe or pervasive,” the remedy would be inadequate.  Private lawsuits are 
an incomplete device to fully respond to sexual harassment because structural 
inequalities remain unchallenged and will continue to sustain sexual 
harassment in housing. 
Recognizing the right of the tenant to safety and privacy in her home, 
however, is a first step to effectuating the goal of a housing market free of 
discrimination.  Courts should acknowledge that the landlord is not entitled to 
construct a business transaction that is an exchange of sex for shelter and that 
such a transaction, even if veiled as a private market exchange, deserves the 
intervention of the court.  The most vulnerable tenants, including victims of 
domestic violence attempting to flee abusive relationships, should not be 
placed in the position of choosing between sexual abuse and a home.  Courts 
have now recognized that privacy should not shield the perpetrator of domestic 
violence.  It is also time for the doctrine of privacy to stop sheltering 
perpetrators of sexual harassment in the home. 
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